Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson

Field-Marshal Lord Wilson of Libya GCB GBE DSO

(References

Lord Wilson of Libya, Eight Years Overseas Hutchinson & co. (Publishers) Ltd 3rd impression - 8y

Winston S Churchill  The Second World War, 7th impression,1954 The Reprint Society/Cassell   SWW)

Henry Maitland-Wilson was born in 1881, served in the South African War (Boer War) in 1900 at the beginning of his career, and in 1944 took over command as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean from General Eisenhower. Affectionately known as Jumbo by the troops under his command, his military career was marked by a high level of competence in which he carried out his tasks efficiently and unobtrusively (except to the enemy) and was crowned by success in a hard fought campaign in the Italian mountains. It spanned an extraordinary period from the beginning of aviation to participation in the implementation of the decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan.  He commenced his career during the high point of late Victorian and Edwarian imperial confidence, saw the destruction of a class and a way of life in the Great War and finally the beginning of the nuclear age and the revolution of mass communication and transport before his death in 1964.

In his final military command he was responsible for the successful campaign to evict the Germans from Italy and for two major amphibious landings, at Anzio and the Anvil/Dragoon landings at Fréjus/St Raphael.

During a period when the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill did not tolerate failure, he was remarkable for successfully holding such senior commands in his sixties.  He also won the approbation of his opponents.

The great question faced by an analyst of Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson’s career is the extent of his contribution to the victories and successes of his subordinate officers. A characteristic of the campaigns which he commanded is the generally quiet efficiency with which their objectives were attained. As the commanding officer, he would undoubtedly have been blamed for failure, so it is only reasonable that he should be commended for the successes. With subordinates such as Generals Alexander and Freyburg it is tempting to assign the responsibility for success to them, but Maitland Wilson had proved his ability in several difficult operations, and the overwhelming victory at Sidi Barrani before he took overall command of the Mediterranean theatre and the Italian campaign.

Sir Henry was descended from the Maitlands of Dundrennan, descended in turn from Mautalents of Normandy and Lauderdale.  His family were described as spice merchants, resident at Maitland House, Greenwich in the first quarter of the 19th century. Two daughters from the family married in successive generations into a family of merchant bankers named Wilson who had originally been tenant farmers on the estate of the very eccentric Harper Crewe family in Derbyshire. Since these two marriages the family added Maitland to their names.(Lord Wilson)

Henry Maitland-Wilson was born in 1881 and educated at Eton and Sandhurst. He joined the Rifle Brigade in the South African war of 1900 to 1902. During the First World War he served in France and was Major G.S.O.2 in the 56th Division on the Somme. By 1918 he was Chief Staff Officer, GSO1 for the New Zealand Division in France.  One of his battalion adjutants, reputedly the youngest in the British army was Anthony Eden. The next time they met was in 1940 when Eden was Secretary of State for War, and Maitland-Wilson was General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt. (Lord Wilson)

The Campaigns and appointments

1940 - 1941, first Western Desert campaign

The first Western Desert campaign was almost the first success of World War II.

As General, Maitland-Wilson required his staff to travel whenever possible across the desert by car to become familiar with the terrain and the conditions which the troops would encounter, especially the quality of the ground and ease of traverse. (8y p22)

Lieutenant-General Maitland-Wilson commanded the British forces in the battle of Sidi Barrani which began on 6 December 1940 and was fought over a territory the size of Yorkshire. British forces totalled 31,000 men(8y, p50), or 25,000 men(SWW2, p480) By the 11 December, the Italian army was in full flight.  He attributed his success to achieving complete surprise. (8y,p53)

Vast numbers of  prisoners were taken, and the battalion headquarters of the Coldstream Guards signalled that it was impossible to count the prisoners, but “there were about five acres of officers and two hundred acres of other ranks.” (Sww,2,p481)

Churchill commented at the time “A victory which is of the first order, and reflects the highest credit upon Sir Archibald Wavell, Sir* Henry Maitland-Wilson, the Staff officers who planned this exceedingly complicated operation, and the troops who performed the remarkable feats of endurance and daring which accomplished it. The whole episode must be judged upon the background of the fact that it is only three or four months ago that our anxieties for the defence of Egypt were acute.” 

 [* Not knighted until 1943]

Sidi Barrani, 6 - 11 December 1940

British forces 25,000 or 31,000

First phase:

38,000 prisoners, British casualties 133 killed, 387 wounded, 8 missing

50 tanks and 400 guns taken; (8y 53)

Second phase:

Capture of Tobruk 21 January

Total of two battles:

113,000 prisoners  400 tanks and 1290 guns taken

British casualties 500 killed, 1373 wounded, 55 missing;

Italian armies expelled from Cyrenaica. British forces hold Benghazi.   Following the battle, January 1941, Maitland-Wilson was appointed Military Governor of Cyrenaica. (8y,p58)

Greece   1941

22 February to 2 May 1941 Commander British Army, Greece

The background to this operation was the occupation of Albania by Italy in 1939. The Italians went on to attack Greece in 1941 and for political reasons it was considered essential to provide some aid to Greece to honour a promise made in 1939. A German attack was anticipated, and once this had commenced in April using 15 divisions of the German 12th army diverted from the proposed Russian campaign, there appears to have been little prospect of a successful defence. The Greek army was very badly equipped and withdrew steadily. The Greek government recommended evacuation of the British troops, and Maitland-Wilson completed this operation successfully. (8y, pp67-103)

The significance of this operation lay not in the direct military operations, but in the effect they had on German strategy, and in particular on the assault on Russia. British support for Greece provoked an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia which so enraged Hitler that he insisted on an immediate attack on Yugoslavia and Greece. Diversion of the German 12th army of 27 divisions for this purpose fatally delayed the assault on the Soviet Union which was planned to be complete before the onset of winter. The Germans had not provided any winter clothing for their troops (8y,pp106-106). Maitland-Wilson draws a parallel between this operation and the attack on Corunna in 1808 which provoked Napoleon’s occupation of Madrid and precipitated the ultimately disastrous (for the French) Peninsula War. (8y p102)

As a direct result, the German forces failed to secure a decisive victory before the onset of winter, were held outside Moscow by the Russians in adverse conditions, and were finally defeated at Stalingrad in January 1943.

The German failure to capture Moscow was fatal to the entire German war strategy and kept Germany on the defensive from 1942 onwards.

Despite the need to evacuate British forces from Greece, Maitland-Wilson emerged from this campaign with his reputation undamaged.

Iraq campaign 1941

No sooner than Jumbo had returned to Cairo from the evacuation of Greece, he was appointed to command the British troops in Palestine and Transjordan with a brief to relieve the siege of the RAF base at Habbaniya about 70 miles west of Baghdad, and then to raise the siege of the British Embassy in Baghdad. Habbaniya was 560 miles (8y, pp106) east of the British army base in Haifa. The relief was completed in three weeks. The siege of the embassy was raised two weeks later. (8y, pp106-108)

Churchill describes the operation which was undertaken on his orders against Wavell’s advice as a “swift and complete success”. (8y, pp104-130)

Churchill’s memoirs make it clear that the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East were adamant that the forces allocated were quite inadequate.

Syria / Lebanon

With Iraq back under friendly control, Maitland-Wilson turned his attention to the Levant where the French forces were supporting the German campaign. Beirut was seized after a three-headed attack launched from Iraq via Damascus, Palmyra and the south. Maitland-Wilson had 15 battalions (no tanks) to oppose 30 French battalions and 90 tanks.  The operation took six weeks. (8y, pp110-118)

At this stage Churchill (July 1941) recommended that Maitland-Wilson be appointed to command the next offensive. Instead he was appointed to the Persia-Iraq command. “We were all very sorry that we could not persuade him (Auchinleck) to entrust the battle, when it should come, to General Maitland-Wilson.”

Middle East & Mediterranean 1943 - 1944

Maitland-Wilson was appointed Commander-in-Chief Middle East in February 1943, to succeed Alexander three months after the successful battle of El Alamein. By this stage the German armies were in full retreat. The task was to maintain and supply the 8th Army in its operations to drive the enemy out of Africa and to prepare for the attack on Sicily, “Husky”.

The logistic problems were substantial with the army over 1,000 miles from Egypt and advancing further. A key priority was to open up the port of Tripoli. The advance into Tunisia was hard fought with the enemy making full use of a number of strong positions. The campaign was complete by 12th May 1943.

On 16 June 1943 Maitland-Wilson was knighted in the field by the King, along with Montgomery. (8y,162)

The command was enlivened by the capture of a party of Kurdish speaking Germans engaged in fomenting a revolt in Iraq. Although correctly dressed, they were easily recognised and arrested because their clothes were clean! (8y,153)

Once the North African campaign was complete, Maitland-Wilson’s headquarters in Cairo became a centre of travel and social activity. Guests usually left his house at midnight to catch their planes, and the rooms were often filled before they had left the house. Frequently, however the flights were cancelled and the distinguished guests returned to the house to find their rooms occupied. The General often found a senior officer asleep on a sofa in the hall when he left for his morning ride at 0630. (8y,170)

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean

The Middle East was essentially a staff command with little or no operational responsibilities, but in December 1943, Maitland-Wilson was appointed to succeed Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. The importance of this appointment should not be under-stated. Maitland-Wilson was responsible for the campaign to expel the German armies from Italy and for the allied landings in the south of France and the subsequent campaign until the armies under his command linked up with those under Eisenhower’s command following the Battle of Normandy.

General Eisenhower describes this command thus: "He took charge of the Mediterranean forces when......the bleak prospect was one of winter fighting in unfriendly terrain and harsh climate, with land communications almost non-existent. Moreover, the Mediterranean forces were then engaged in shipping back to the United Kingdom a significant portion of their own strength in preparation for the overland campaign  of the spring of '44. Field Marshal Wilson's record of accomplishment under such difficult conditions entitles to the most respectful hearing anything he has to say upon the conduct of war, and especially on the subject of welding allies into an efficient team of destructive power."  Bearing in mind Eisenhower's own skills in the latter field of activity, this is high praise indeed. (8y, Foreword)

Kesselring, commander of the German Tenth Army in Italy has stated that the harmonious co-operation of the Allied Army, Air and Naval forces under one supreme command was regarded by the Germans with envy.

The conditions of the Italian campaign should be clearly understood.  The terrain is mountainous, and hence first class defensive territory.  The Germans prepared a vigorous defence, and had fortified three defensive lines, two to protect the approach to Rome, the Gustav Line and the Adolf Hitler Line, running across Italy about half way between Naples and Rome, centred on the Monte Cassino position, and based on three rivers in the area, and a third, the Gothic Line north of Florence(runnig from midway between Spezia and Pisa, across the Fute Pass, the high point in the mountains between Florance and Bologna, to Rimini).  The German commander, Kesselring was considered a first class opponent, and also had some excellent troops under his command who fought tenaciously.  The Allies had 23 divisions to 26 German and two Italian ones.  Following the Italian armistice of 1943, although the bulk of the Italian army and navy were not in the front line, they supported the Allies.  The Allies enjoyed an enormous superiority in air forces by the end of the campaign, though in the early stages this was not the case.

This was a hard fought campaign, marked by excellent tactical and strategic thinking. It drew eight (SWW, v5, 384),or ten (SWW, v5, 476) divisions from German forces elsewhere in Europe, three divisions were destroyed north of Rome, and most of the remainder were severely stricken, hurrying northwards in a confused retreat.  Rome was captured on 4th June, the eve of D-Day, which was an excellent omen for the invasion of Normandy. By October 1944, the armies had breached the Gothic line north of Florence.  This was achieved despite the withdrawal of seven divisions - the US Seventh Army and four French divisions for the landings in the south of France in August 1944 - "Dragoon".   In December 1944, Maitland-Wilson was appointed to Washington.

This can be accounted an excellent record of achievement, though it was not without its problems and controversies, especially in the battles for Monte Cassino and at Anzio.

Under Maitland-Wilson’s command were:

General Alexander , Commander-in-Chief of the armies in Italy;

General Clark,  General in charge of Operation “Anvil”.

In making this appointment, Churchill told Roosevelt “I am satisfied that for the great co-ordination task which will be entrusted to him he has all the qualifications and the necessary vigour.”  (SWW v5, p 333)

The immediate operation in hand when Maitland-Wilson took up his command was the landing at Anzio, about 50 miles south of Rome. The Anzio operation aroused a fair degree of controversy, both over the scale of the equipment landed in the first wave, and because of the failure to break quickly out of the beachhead. Monte Cassino has also been very controversial, both in view of the length of the operations required to capture the position, and because of the destruction of the medieval monastery.

The strategic thinking behind the Anzio landings was to turn the flank of the enemy fortified Gustav Line based on the Monte Cassino position (Rivers Gargliano, Liri, and Rapido and Monte Cassino) and the Adolf Hitler Line (Pontcorvo, Acquino, Piedimonte, 5 miles further north) and to advance on Rome. Anzio lies about half way between Monte Cassino and Rome.

Maitland-Wilson took over operational responsibility for Anzio on the 8 January 1944, and the assault took place on the 22 January, two weeks later. He was therefore not responsible for the planning, but in view of Churchill’s complaints, it is worth examining this issue. He was concerned to discover (SWW v5, p380) that by the 14th day after landing, the army planned to have in a very confined space 70,000 men and 18,000 vehicles, including 380 tanks. There were thus one vehicle for every 3.5 men, and if the vehicle drivers are excluded, one vehicle for every three men.  This was all within a bridgehead only 14 miles deep. Churchill never received a satisfactory answer to his questions on this topic, but it aroused concern other the equally extravagant equipment plans for Overlord, due to commence in less than four months time (at that stage scheduled for May 1944).

The slow break out from Anzio and the failure to out-flank the German defence lines at Monte Cassino are a more serious criticism. The army recalled the vigorous German counter-attack at Salerno and did not dare to advance rapidly after a successful initial landing.

The landings achieved both strategic and tactical surprise, but the advance from the bridge-head was delayed which gave the Germans the opportunity to bring up forces to oppose the landing. Maitland-Wilson (8y, p 194) comments that the attacking troops were bewildered by having effected surprise, and did not have the tanks required to resist a German counter-attack. A rapid advance would have left the army very exposed to a counter-attack on the scale which developed. Part of the operational plan included an assault on the Monte Cassino positions, which failed both to capture its objective and to divert troops from the Anzio bridge-head. In the event some American Rangers units had pressed forward ahead of the British and were never seen again. (8y, p 193)

Churchill criticised the generals for failing to prosecute the attack with sufficient vigour, (SWW v5 378), but Maitland-Wilson responded that both Alexander and Clark were on the beachhead in the first 48 hours to urge offensive action. The initial plan had not anticipated such a degree of success, and the armour required to exploit the position and defend the beachhead had not been landed at that early stage.

Churchill’s concern probably arose from his experience of the Dardanelles landings which were not exploited despite total surprise because of the limited objectives set for the troops and the failure of the general officers to take proper command of the battle. A slow exploitation of the initial success was a poor omen for Overlord.

Attention must now turn to Monte Cassino. Whilst the Anzio beachhead was static, continuous assaults were being made on the fortified positions at Monte Cassino. The Germans had created two fortified lines based on the mountain, topped by a medieval monastery, and these were protected by two rivers. The whole complex was a deep defensive line with a great fortified position with lavish use of concrete and steel. (SWW v5 372)  The first assault on the lines was timed to coincide with the Anzio landings, but as noted above, was repelled.

The second series of assaults began in May. Many observers, including Churchill questioned the need for a frontal attack on the Monte Cassino position, and Anzio was the first attempt to outflank the German lines. Cassino dominated the valley with the only practicable road leading to Rome. Between Cassino and the sea there were substantial mountains (which were finally secured by Moroccan specialist mountain troops) and to the East the Apennines were equally impassable. This position blocked the entire advance on Rome, and could not be out-flanked by a attack on the mountains to the East.

The second assault on the Monte Cassino positions commenced in May 1994 with a total of 28 allied divisions opposed to 23 German divisions. The objective was the “destruction and ruin of the armed force of the enemy south of Rome”.  A series of attacks and feints secured tactical surprise whilst the Germans were relieving their troops and one of their army commanders was about to go on leave, other senior officers were already on leave (swwv5,p464)(8Y 209).

The West flank of the German line was turned by specialised Moroccan mountain troops, and the Cassino position became isolated so that Polish forces were able to seize the mountain top position.

Once through the Gustav Line, the 8th Army faced the Adolf Hitler Line. The Anzio breakout was timed to coincide with the assault on this line. The breakout threatened the German lines of communication and forced the enemy to fight on two fronts. The attack began on the 23 May and the Adolf Hitler line was out-flanked on the West, whilst forces from Anzio threatened both the German rear and also communications with Rome. Only the providential arrival of an extra German division prevented a major disaster for the enemy. The presence of so many stores in the Anzio beachhead provided an extra impetus to the attack which reached Rome on the 4 June, the eve of the Normandy  landings. By the 14 June, the allies were 80 miles north of Rome, before the advance slowed due to lengthening lines of communication.

Anvil / Dragoon landings in the south of France

As allied forces entered Rome, Maitland-Wilson’s attention was turned to the invasion of southern France to support the Overlord operation. Anxious to avoid the stagnation which marred the Anzio assault, he refused to sanction the operation until sufficient forces were available to exploit fully any initial success. This required substantially more landing craft than were available in the Mediterranean theatre. Until the Normandy invasion was fully effective, landing craft could not be released from the Channel. The other problem Maitland-Wilson faced was that the forces in Italy would have to be depleted in order to attack in France.

This task was made easier by the success of the Monte Cassino / Rome campaign which had reduced Kesselring’s forces from over 20 divisions to the fighting equivalent of 6(8y,p216). A further 6 low quality divisions were in northern Italy, and he probably required a further 10 divisions to mount a successful defence. Maitland-Wilson was reluctant to allow the enemy any time for recuperation and was keen to attack in the Po valley and from there into Austria, but this option was overruled. Churchill  later commented that he regretted this decision which allowed the Russians to reach Vienna before us. (SWW v6, p94) The final decision was to withdraw 7 divisions from the Italian front for the attack on France.  The operation required assembly of troops and stores from all over the Mediterranean, from Oran in Algeria to Bari in the Adriatic (8y 220)  Naples, Taranto, Brindisi and Oran were the main departure points (SWW v6  92)

The landings on 14 August at Fréjus achieved complete tactical surprise (8y 222); although the enemy had strong shore defences and anticipated an attack, they had expected a landing on the Italian coast near Genoa. The initial success was swiftly exploited, and within a week American forces had reached Valence. This exceptionally rapid advance prevented the enemy from stabilising any defensive front (8y 222). By11 September 1944 the advance had linked up near Dijon with Eisenhower’s forces from Overlord, and operational control was transferred to him in accordance with previous plans.

Meanwhile, Maitland-Wilson’s attention returned to the Italian front.  Florence had been captured on the 13 August, and the enemy now had 26 divisions to the Allied 21. However, the German air forces were now negligible, and the allies held the initiative. Furthermore, the succession of successful seaborne assaults forced the enemy to divert substantial forces to protect his flanks on both coasts(8y, 227).

The Gothic Line, from south of Spezia, north of Florence  to Pesaro in Northern Italy was still under construction, and the tenacious defence of the Apennines suggested that the enemy were doing their best to delay the Allied advance pending completion of these new defences. The allied armies for their part realised that pressure on the defensive front diverted resources from its construction.  Whilst the Germans were reinforcing their troops on this front, and had sent a further 8 divisions to Italy (SWW, v6, 94) the allies were reducing theirs, and the situation was complicated by an allied shortage of artillery ammunition. (8y 237).

In late August the 8th army attacked on the eastern flank of the Gothic Line, and by the 1 September had reached Rimini which fell on the 20 September. The Germans withdrew 7 divisions from their centre and right wing to defend Rimini, which gave the allies the opportunity to break through at the centre, and by mid October the allied line was within 20 miles of Bologna. Early in December Ravenna was captured.

Maitland-Wilson’s campaign in the Mediterranean now came to an end as he was appointed Head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and personal representative of the Prime Minister in military matters to the President of the USA.

Washington, DC

Maitland-Wilson arrived in New York on the 19 January 1945 with ice on the river. This post was essentially diplomatic, with the responsibility for co-ordination of the three British service missions in Washington and for developing under the instruction of the British Chiefs of Staff the directives concerning the overall strategy of the war and priorities for operations, supply and transportation as well as ammunition. Bearing in mind the impact on the Mediterranean theatre of supplies of landing craft and ammunition, the critical nature of this appointment becomes immediately apparent. (8y,245)

By far the most critical of the many strategic and allocation decisions was the debate on the use of the atom bomb on Japan. This decision naturally was made at the highest level, between the Prime Minister (now Attlee) and the President. The Japanese were warned by the Potsdam Ultimatum on the 26 July 1945 of the power of the weapon, and this was rejected with contempt within 2 days. (8y 259)  Accordingly, the decision was taken to use this weapon, and bombs were dropped on Hiroshima  on 6 August and on Nagasaki on the 9 August. The Japanese surrendered on 15 August 1945.

From then on, the task was to demobilise the armies and administer the occupation. On 22 April 1946 Maitland-Wilson closed down the Washington Office and returned to the U.K. for a well earned retirement, which was interrupted by his appointment as Constable of HM Tower of London 1955 -1960.